OnPrincipleBlog

Iraq Metric #4: Hearts & Minds Won:

This latest post exploring ways to judge success in Iraq build upon:

1. The 3 levels of our war on terror
2. An overview of how to measure success in Iraq
3. Metric #1: Combatant Eradicated
4. Metric #2: Accelerants to Violence Seized
5. Metric #3: Populations Freed

The basest assumption upon which the Global Long War on Terrorism is executed is that every human heart yearns for liberty, opportunity and self-determination. Yet, in Iraq we have encountered not a population welcoming Coalition troops with open arms, but an insurgency lead by mostly foreigners, but very much trooped by Iraqi people. To the average American, this reality has been perplexing, frustrating and frightening. If they don’t love us, WHO in the world DO they love? And what are the implications?

The Question:

After 9/11, most Americans (though not, it seems, the current Democratic leadership, the Liberal Bogs and much of the left leaning media) have no trouble understanding that Al Qaeda is committed to global Jihad and will stop at nothing to see America and other Western/free nations lose popularity, power, prestige and people. So, why is it that average Iraqi’s seem to distrust us and resist actively supporting our efforts to stabilize THEIR country?

Siding with Winners:

The answer is simultaneously simple and deeply profound. It’s implications cut to the heart of both our military strategy and our domestic politics.

Embattled Iraqi citizens aren’t stupid and Al Qaeda isn’t lazy.

The core to terrorism’s effectiveness is its ability to cower an entire population before relatively few oppressors. In this sense, terrorism can be a powerful force multiplier. The Jihadists in Iraq know this and are very vigilant in maintaining the necessary rhythm of attacks to imprison Iraqi mothers and fathers within stockades of internalized fear. These terrorist Overlords wickedly seek control through making examples out of the irreligious, rebellious and “traitorous”.

Iraqis have watched America establish a pattern of stirring up a mess and leaving the locals to clean it up. This is what happened during the US-encouraged Shiite uprising in the 1990’s which Saddam brutally suppressed while America watched. This is what occurred for 3 years across Iraq as Coalition forces cleared cities from terrorists but retreated back to their heavily fortified bases and watched as terror leaders filtered back into the population and meted out vengeance.

Iraqi’s aren’t stupid. They are not going to continue to stand with America if America isn’t going to stand firm with them. The price for our fickleness is paid in blood by them and their families.

This is why the Surge strategy was so important. It marked a change in our troop deployment from entrenchment within fortified bases to distributed neighborhood presence. It changed our focus from clearing territory to holding local populations. As we proved our determination to this strategy in the Spring, local Iraqi leaders started to warily assent that we had finally determined to win. These Iraqi’s decided they want to side with the winners. Slowly, in freed population after freed population, Tribe Amerikani is finally being embraced as liberators and “arbiters of Justice” – because we finally demonstrated some resolve to be more determined, more vigilant and more powerful than the terrorists.

The Alternative:

The alternative to demonstrating commitment to our cause is to look for ways to cut our investment, lessen our exposure and leave Iraq to the Iraqis. There is much about this notion that is indeed tempting. Yet, the stronger these voices become, the stronger Iraqi leaders must question our commitment and the riskier it becomes for them to support us by pointing out terrorists, taking up arms themselves, notifying us of IED’s and booby trapped buildings, etc.

Iraqis know the terrible price which they and their families will pay if we retreat. They have lived through the Hellish death squads Al Qaeda unleashes on recalcitrant villages.

Some American thought leaders (from both the Left and the Right) are starting to recognize this difficult truth. While Americans are being killed and are killing (both are horrible and ugly), the stronger is their presence on the ground, the safer are 25 million Iraqis. The liberal-leaning Brookings Institution concludes:

“The only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into a Lebanon- or Bosnia-like maelstrom,” a new report from the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution concludes, “is 135,000 American troops.” Rapid withdrawal, the report says, could bring “a humanitarian nightmare” in which we should expect “hundreds of thousands (conceivably even millions) of people to die.” (emphasis mine)

Love Breeds Hope:

Iraqis have been hunkered in battle, resistant to starvation, imperiled by a police state, confronted by chemical weapons and terrorized by tyrants. All of these villains have demonstrated a commitment and constancy to their cause. So while changing our tactics and our dialogue to convey commitment is key, we must also continue to demonstrate the vitality and constancy of American charity.

The list of ways in which our troops are serving the Iraqi people is too lengthy to summarize and doesn’t do justice to the personalized outpouring of care and concern from our troops to each freed population. These acts of servant leadership rebuild the desolate hopes of Iraqis and hasten the turning of their hearts to assisting our cause.

Moreover, this support is very practical in nature. Left completely devoid of savings, economy, education and the like – Iraqis need our assistance to meet their basic needs. This is Maslow’s Hierarchy in action. Only after the ability for their families to subsist and rest at peace has been confirmed, can a responsible Iraqi father even think of accepting the risk of assisting Coalition troops. Thus, the faster we supply these needs, the faster we open new doors of insight into the terrorists, garner new sources of critical intelligence and join with new allies in our fight.

Hope Breeds Resolve:

Once hope is rekindled in these hearts darkened by terror, Iraqis grasp the resolve to fan these first warming flames. The last 4 months have been filled with stories of Iraqi’s taking up arms to protect them selves, encouraging young men to join in the Iraqi Police Force, mobilizing neighborhood watch units, informing on the terrorists, etc. At latest estimate, as many as 30,000 former insurgents are now siding with the Coalition, turning on Al Qaeda and submitting to the direction of the central Iraqi government.

These actions stem directly from our demonstration of both power and resolve. In response, freed populations are demonstrating the resolve to both hold their area and assist in the freeing of other populations.

This is how critical mass turns the tide. This is how lowly, imprecise metrics of combatants eradicated and accelerants to violence seized multiply into Iraqi hearts and minds won and united in the fight for freedom.

Each heart emboldened behind a mind united with us is a ratio multiplier. It means fewer suppliers of accelerants to violence. It means fewer recruits. It mean more eyes, ears, experience and support for freedom. It means former insurgents turning from violence to supporting the central government and Coalition efforts.

Locals Protect Themselves:

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13216&Itemid=128

Al Qeda informing on themselves. . .

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2121006.ece

Anatomy of the Tribal Revolt Against Al Qaida:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/

Tribe Amerikani:

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MGRmYWI2Njk5MWFkYzYzYWY4OWY5NzJjMGRkZTlhY2Q=

American Arbitors of Justice:

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/baqubah-update-05-july-2007.htm

Brookings = Millions die If US Leaves:

Pasted from <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-goldberg24jul24,0,5797195.story?coll=la-opinion-center>

On Principle,

Cbass

Japan has a new Prime Minister and, perhaps more importantly, the Free World is reminded it has a faithful friend.

The results are in. Yasuo Fukuda has won a very lopsided win over his rival Taro Aso. The two men both represent the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which in Japan is actually a group closely aligned with George W. Bush conservatism.

Most Americans would remember the LDP’s most colorful leader, Junichiro Koizumi; the Elvis loving, staunch ally of the US and personal friend of President Bush.

What’s important about this election is definitely something about who won, but it’s more about their shared position on policies which most American’s would assume to separate the two rivals - Japan’s continued support for coalition efforts in the Middle East.

After a full week of campaigning, there were few policy differences between the two candidates on many important issues. . . both have also inherited Abe’s insistence on continuing Japan’s support of coalition forces in Afghanistan through its refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.

Students of history will remember that Japan acquiesced to a humiliating surrender in the face of America’s nuclear arsenal. Since those days, Japan’s constitution, both its written document of governance and its wounded national psyche, has forbidden the nation to raise and launch an offensive military force for over 60 years. In this light, it was amazing to see Japanese soldiers involved in the coalition of nations who fought to overthrow Saddam and wrest control in Iraq. After several years of struggle, Japanese soldiers left the theater of Iraq, but the Japanese military has been continuously supporting the Coalition forces in the Middle East theater ever since.

Say what we will about how Pres. Bush has “supposedly” lost all international support, Japan will be a key player in a world of power which is shifting the Pacific.

It’s nice to have faithful friends.

On Principle,

CBass

This latest post exploring ways to judge success in Iraq build upon:
1. The 3 levels of our war on terror
2. An overview of how to measure success in Iraq
3. Metric #1
4. Metric #2

The Distinction of Terror:
In our efforts to understand our Long War on Terrorism, it is absolutely crucial to understand the core difference between acts of terror which wage war against the human heart, groups who perpetrate acts of terror and the entirely different nature of terror groups backed, financed and equipped by nation-states. This distinction defines the very heart of how progress in Iraq must be measured.

Gangs and Mafia groups pursue their own ends through acts of terror. In Gangs, these ends are often the provision of illusory power over lowly circumstances, acceptance in a respected peer group and addiction to adrenaline. Eventually these ends mature to quests similar to those of the Mafia: control of territory, pursuit of illicit profit, expansion of influence through a sub-culture of hierarchical structures and thuggish armies. These groups are normally best addressed through police action which disrupts their operations, imprisons leaders and bridges the legions of followers into legitimate pursuits.

State-sponsored terrorism, by contrast, while using the same tactics and desiring the same ends as those sought by Gangs and Mafia groups, is specifically focused on achieving political ends. One of the latest UN definitions of Terrorism states:

criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them”. (GA Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism” (emphasis mine)

Thus, by its very nature, state-sponsored terrorism is intrinsically about winning control over population groups to achieve a political purpose.

Politics and Population:
Politics is an animal which can only exist where there are people. Without a population, there is no political agenda to be pushed or political purpose to be gained. Terror groups need safe havens in the backwater towns of Somalia, the elevated crags of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the barren expanses of Western Iraq. But as a mater of necessity their single focus is to move from the training ground of obscurity to the operational imperative of population centers. These centers provide both the “raison d’etre” for their purpose and the accelerants (money, support, housing, munitions, transportation, industry, and the unique leverage of human life) to violence which multiple their capacity to kill human hope.

All the time, these terrorists who are pursuing their own political agendas are being safely animated from a distance by nation-state puppeteers. These masters of manipulation are then quick to realize the gains of population dominance - the furtherance of national influence, ambition and, in many cases, profiteering (black gold anyone?).

I think Charles Krauthammer illustrates this point brilliantly:

Thought experiment: Bring in a completely neutral observer — a Martian — and point out to him that the United States is involved in two hot wars against radical Islamic insurgents. One is in Afghanistan, a geographically marginal backwater with no resources and no industrial or technological infrastructure. The other is in Iraq, one of the three principal Arab states, with untold oil wealth, an educated population, an advanced military and technological infrastructure that, though suffering decay in the later years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, could easily be revived if it falls into the right (i.e., wrong) hands. Add to that the fact that its strategic location would give its rulers inordinate influence over the entire Persian Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states. Then ask your Martian: Which is the more important battle? He would not even understand why you are asking the question.

Our State-sponsored terrorist enemies crave the power, prestige and positional leverage the gain through control of Iraqi populations centers.

Freeing a People:
If economic and political pressure don’t cause these cords of control to be retracted, then military force must cause them to be to cut. Once separated from, or limited in access to, the channels through which accelerants to violence can be imported, the shock troops of terror must seek to maintain their grip on the population through increasingly desperate terrorist atrocities. Only skillful and persistent pursuit will drive these carcinogenic agents from the life-giving nutrition of population centers.

This is why Coalition Counterinsurgency Advisor Kilcullen describes the purpose of the surge as being to:

“When we speak of “clearing” an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation.”

“The “terrain” we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on.”

“The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.”

The Fulcrum of Force:
Freeing population centers carries a “force multiplication” factor with it. It weakens the terrorists by separating them from their rallying point of purpose and from the industrial base which supplies them with new accelerants to violence. Such action also communicates powerfully to other populations currently suffering from oppression that if they will join with us, they too can taste the sweet air of security. Thus, Metrics #’s 1 and 2 (Combatants Eradicated and Accelerants to Violence Seized) serve to indicate our success in freeing initial population centers. As Metric #3 (Populations freed) reaches a critical mass, the tide of war begins to turn from desperate struggle to optimistically hopeful persistence.

A Moral Choice:
When confronted by such ugly realities and hopeful opportunities, people of faith have two basic choices. Individuals in positions of political power can quietly maneuver as missional agents of change. Intercessors can pray, churches can support and missionaries can outreach to the terrorist, perhaps to the point of laying down their own lives. This road is certainly the higher one. It is also the only road likely to yield lasting results. Terrorists are immersed in a cult of death which has prepared them since the inception of their mission to die in the pursuit of a cause they view to be noble. To change their persuasion, their hearts must be turned to the God who is the “God of the living”, the “Resurrection and the life”, the God who taunts, “Oh Death, where is your victory”.

Secular leaders, however, must also confront this stubborn truth: this first choice is the longer road. It must be pursued if there is to be lasting change and lasting hope for peace. But in the pursuing, untold numbers of innocents are being subjected to a literal hell on Earth. In such a situation, despite if one supported the initial US invasion of Iraq or not, is it the position of a moral government to let the Middle East work out its own solution? Is this the lesson of history’s concentration camps, killing fields, gulags, ghettos, torture rooms and ethnic cleansings? Is this the appropriate response for a nation who views its calling to be a nation set on a hill?

Is it possible the troops of our government should pursue the immediate release of populations from their earthbound oppressors while armies of compassion walk the longer road toward eternal peace for both captured/surrendered oppressors and the now-formerly oppressed?

How then do we define success?:

• First, we must question if our politicians are taking into account the draconian evil which will be given full reign in Iraq should the terrorist be permitted unrestrained domination of the population centers and beyond Iraq as they exploit the accelerants to violence found in those population centers?

• Second, do our elected representatives seriously address the successes won in freeing people from the prison of terrorist tyranny?

Here are some possible measure of success and examples of these measure:

• % of population under law & order (Coalition, then Local)
• 50% of Baghdad was secured as of July
• 7 of 18 provinces currently under total Iraqi control - 9 of 18 planned by year’s end.

• % of GDP within these areas

• % of key industries within these areas (oil, electricity, food distribution)

On Principle,
CBass

I’m extremely excited to see the White House stepping up their seriousness in communicating the vision for our struggle in the Long War on Terrorism - especially its currently central battle ground in Iraq. More importantly, it’s extremely gratifying to see the President personally promoting meaningful measures of our success in the surge of operations in the Iraq theater.

In his much maligned speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) gathering in Kansas City, the President supplied one of the measures for which I have been advocating: Combatant Eradicated.

From the Speech:

In Iraq, our troops are taking the fight to the extremists and radicals and murderers all throughout the country. Our troops have killed or captured an average of more than 1,500 al Qaeda terrorists and other extremists every month since January of this year.

That’s between 10,000 - 12,000 combatants removed from the battle field - since January!

As I proposed in a former post, this particular metric, while superior to Vietnam era measures of enemy “kills”, is still orphaned of interpretive context without being paired with some additional metrics.

I hope that that this new surge of communication from the President will further embrace a full-throated, hearty display of defense which makes use of a full arsenal measures. Perhaps the upcoming surge of support from candidates, media savvy supporters and political leaders will also present the American people with a substantive sense of our progress by referencing success factors which stretch beyond the obvious stale examples for which opponents are well prepared to refute.

On Principle,

CBass

Today’s post is a brief analysis of the 2nd Metric which should be used to build a fuller interpretive context in terms of our progress in establishing the safety and security of an ally in Iraq. It builds on these previous thoughts:
1. The 3 levels of our war on terror
2. An overview of how to measure success in Iraq

Combatant Contraband :
As examined previously, we need to more publicly communicate and analyze Coalition victories in eradicating combatants (killed, surrendered and imprisoned - especially those in terrorist leadership). But there is a greater context to this metric - it’s the context not discussed in Vietnam. Quantifying the number of combatants eradicated informs us at to the effectiveness of our operations, but not as to the strength of our adversary. To measure our operational success in this context, we must understand the well spring from which terrorist acts are drawn.

Explosive Terror:
Terrorist acts, like the suicide bombs which have been seared into our minds as an instant association, are characterized by an explosion of pent up energy. This is what science would call an exothermic event - an event which quickly dissipates stored energy outward. This sudden, seemingly random, unexpected explosion of heated hatred and violence is what catalyzes the reaction of fear in the human heart.

The energy which powers successive acts of terror must come from somewhere. Prior to every exothermic event, there is an endothermic process - a process which absorbs and stores energy to make ready for a potential explosion. In this manner, terror groups and terror networks serve to absorb, store and eventually release explosive acts of terror. These endothermic groups must absorb the means of violence.

Inputs to Terror:
The US military refers to these inputs as “accelerants to violence”. Accelerants can be anything which feeds energy and capability into terror groups. Examples of “Accelerants” may include:

• ○ Money and food
• ○ Munitions and training
• ○ Transportation and staging
• ○ Intelligence and cover

And in the case of Islamic terrorism, an important Accelerant is:

• ○ Irrational hate and Existential reward

State Sourcing:
Waging a terrorist battle on a national level for 4 years, requires massive inputs of these Accelerants to Violence. Terrorists must be recruited and bolstered in their existential mission. They must be armed, trained and mobilized. They must be fed and housed. They must be granted intelligence as to targets and “cover” stories for access (stolen uniforms, black SUV’s, forged security badges, etc).

Republican presidential candidates just invested millions of dollars in finding, recruiting, transporting, feeding, educating and mobilizing a few thousand voters in Ames Iowa. Yet, some in our World want to turn a blind eye to the obvious role nation-states are playing in sponsoring and resourcing terrorist acts and terror networks in Iraq??? Establishing a national network of these accelerants is an enormous task which requires material investments and cultural support which can only be sourced out of the warehouse of nation-states. This is the reason the term, “War” is appropriate in the context of our current struggle.

Journey To the Center of Iraq:
New accelerants imported into Iraq must be transported to their target population, such as Baghdad - the largest population center. What does this look like?

• ○ A human heart must be recruited and radicalized into a terrorist.
• ○ The would be terrorist and the means of attack must be brought across the Iraqi border.
• ○ Terrorists and weapons must be transported.
• ○ In a nation at war and checkered with checkpoints, this journey probably requires several days and numerous safe houses.
• ○ This network requires funding and food to maintain.
• ○ Eventually, new terrorists must be contacted and provided guidance
• ○ When necessary, terrorists must be united with highly technical munitions and/or cover material.

This journey is perilous, difficult and costly. It requires intact terror networks. When we eradicate combatants, we disrupt these inflows of further accelerants to violence. Disrupt, but not eliminate. Once regrouped, the terror network now has fewer inputs to gather - thanks to the accelerants which remain in place. Thus, without this important contextual metric, the count of combatant eradicated is important but merely temporary.

Back to the Surge:
With the above perspective in mind, let’s return to the strategy behind the Surge. The much misunderstood Surge in troops and then in Operations is NOT intended to be the definitive end of terrorist violence in all of Iraq. Indeed, the Surge has 2 very specific aims - 1) To decrease terror capabilities in Baghdad such that the Iraqi government can BEGIN to function and 2) To free key population centers around Baghdad such that local reconciliation and development efforts raise enough micro-cultural support to sustain that locale’s freedom from fear.

Understanding this strategy is critical to measuring the success of the Surge. Our ultimate Long War on Terrorism must deal with uprooting the deeply entrenched accelerants to violence in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Pakistan (especially Waziristan). But in the Surge, it is enough to seize these accelerants in and around Baghdad. And by “around” we are talking 1 - 2 days journey from the capital city.

Victory:
So, we know the Surge is succeeding in eradicating combatants, especially leadership, but how are we doing against these accelerants that, if left in place, make the job easier for the next recruit? Several resources daily report upon this progress, but here I’ll suggest and report just a few:

Original Sources:

1. Multi-National Force - Iraq
2. Michael Yon and Michael Totten
3. State Department Status Reports

Aggregators:

1. Victory Caucus
2. Bill Roggio
3. Iraq Report

Before closing out this post, it seems appropriate to provide a few examples of what this context provides in terms of practical measures.

• The Coalition is receiving local tips as to weapons caches
• Cache seizures are way up since the surge
• Transport systems are being dismantled
• Bomb factories have been closed

Bomb, bomb factories, booby traps, torture rooms, weapons caches, mobilization methods (boats, trucks, safe houses, etc) = Accelerants to Violence Seized

On Principle,
CBass

This is the first deeper look into the balanced approach to measuring our success in Iraq as I first suggested in summary form.

Body Counting Class:
While I find the reticence of the US Armed Forces to promote enemy body counts as a measurement of victory to be a welcome acknowledgment of the horrors of war, I also stand with the frustrated masses who are seeking to gain a perspective on our progress, or lack there of, in Iraq. Let’s face it, body counts are an intuitive and seemingly simple means of counting progress against a standing enemy.

American distaste for body counts was acquired during the protracted Vietnam conflict. Bowing to the assumed power of attrition, US Commanders and political leaders from both parties reported the quantities of North Vietnamese killed in conflict. The obvious assumption was that North Vietnam didn’t have limitless storehouses of supplies, troops or citizen support and that each body count marked a step closer to their forced surrender. Yet, when waves of Viet Cong continued to whittle away at our forces, the American heartland revolted against the use of body count as it clearly wasn’t connected to any classic signs for victory.

While it may be argued that such popular discontent snatched defeat from a certain victory for the US, this is a bit besides the point. It is clear that body counts were not directly correlated in any sort of expected sense to the North’s ability or willingness to press the fight.

Then and Now:
After several decades of disavowing body counts, the Pentagon has been carefully, tentatively and almost apologetically reintroducing this metric in reports on Coalition operations in Iraq. Once again, however, this metric seemed unrelated to the establishment of peace on the battle field. During 2004, 2005 and 2006 these measures, and the predictably sensational suicide attacks to follow their release, led to the much quoted description of “whack-a-mole”. As in this game from a kid’s pizza palace, there is no satisfying vanquishing of the mole. It just keeps getting whacked in one hole and reappearing in another. Ad nauseum. Ad infinitum.

But Why Doesn’t It Work?
As I stated above, the body count metric just seems, intuitively, to make sense. Human beings are a scarce resource. Unless Al Qaeda has learned to clone fighters down in the belly of those caves, they have a limited number of zealots from which to choose. So, why are body counts again getting a bad representation in the left-leaning media?

1. Body Counts describe what quantity have died, not what quantity is alive. Killing 100 insurgents is a big deal when there are only 200 fighting you. It’s not so meaningful when there are 100,000 awaiting glorious martyrdom.

2. Body Counts tally the number of times the mole is whacked. Not the number of holes removed from the game - through which the mole can never return.

3. Body Counts don’t account for the count of the body. Some villains are worth more than others. When we take down an insurgent, is he someone working to plant IED’s or is he just someone who supports “the cause”.

4. Body Counts don’t account for the asymmetrical nature of our battle. Coalition forces develop intelligence, draw up attack plans, move out in formation, take care to space civilians, and take a host of other responsible, precautionary actions to net each “kill”. One insurgent, blended into the population can fight a guerrilla battle through IED’s, kidnapping and other terror tactics which have a multiplying effect. Killing the one terrorist doesn’t mean the other one remaining can’t multiply his impact beyond a binary battlefield equation.

In What Ways Does it Work?
Having outlined the above, one can’t shake the notion that Body Counts do, indeed must, mean something! Killing bad guys has got to mean that the enemy at least needs to recruit, train, equip and deploy one more replacement. So I submit the question is not if Body Counts are or aren’t good metrics of success, in themselves. Body Counts tell us something when the are placed within a larger interpretive context.

In Vietnam, the Body Count metric didn’t measure the following:

1. Support for North Vietnam from China and Russia. (Accelerants to Violence”

2. Support for the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. (Hearts and Minds)

3. To what lasting victory was the body count attached? (Populations Freed)

4. To what end was the body count building? (Political Reconciliation and Institutions Built)

These are the very metrics, coincidently, which I’m advocating we use to contextualize the relatively crude body count accounting.

Together, these metrics don’t just tell us how many we are killing, they tell us:

1. How many more are there and how effective can they be?

2. How free will they be to operate in our territory?

3. Will their deaths lead to a demonstrable and lasting victory of a desired end (like a city)?

4. In the case of Iraq, are freed areas responding by joining and building the institutions which promote and protect peace?

It is only as we can also measure success along these other vectors that the body count figure is truly informative.

Bodies Counted or Combatants Eradicated?
To further press my case, I suggest we expand the body count metric. The power of body counts is that each dead enemy today is one less enemy to fight tomorrow. It doesn’t take kills to achieve this simple goal. Enemies who are captured today and enemies who surrender today are also enemies who won’t fight us tomorrow (absent errant political pressure to release these captives). Thus, I suggest we move beyond body counts to “combatants eradicated.

The combined quantity of combatants killed, captured or surrendered is a much more meaningful metric (especially when combined with the others we will later explore) than just those killed. More importantly, rather than repeating “point in time” numbers, this combined metric should be presented as an updated aggregate total. Aggregation over time allows vectors of progress (or not) to be identified and it updates the accuracy of numbers as captured combatants are questioned and released.

Further, captured and surrendered combatants are potentially MORE valuable because they can provide intelligence into the enemy’s numbers, arms, strategies, locations, identification, etc. Thus, including them in one collective metric may also serve to address the secondary concern questionably inherited from Vietnam: If Body Counts are what count, body counts are what you’ll get - truly enemy or not.

Counting Combatants That Count:
There is one more aspect of counting combatants which should be included in our metrics. Killing, capturing or taking through surrender a leader of the enemy is far more valuable than doing the same to a new recruit. The news pouring in from Iraq informs us that a unique aspect of the surge is the large number of leaders which have been successfully eradicated through coalition efforts. Eradicating leaders doesn’t permanently cripple this enemy, but it certainly has a role is disrupting operations, and en mass, it will probably help in weakening the resolve of non-die hards.

I reported on a list of these in Afghanistan. General Petraeus makes mention of this in an interview with Hugh Hewitt. Bill Roggio includes success in targeting enemy leadership in his weekly recap chronicles.

In the end, I think the counting of “combatants eradicated” from the field of battle is a powerful testimony as to our effectiveness in this war. I just hope our leaders on the home front don’t shortchange such meaningful metrics because of a faulty application 40 years ago in Vietnam.

Summary:

Killed + Captured + Surrendered + leaders = Combatants Eradicated (Neutralized, Removed, whatever)

Updated Aggregates (perhaps by named Operation) = vectors of progress

On Principle,
CBass

I haven’t posted on progress with the Iraq Surge in a while due to my own lack of comfort with how to measure success in an complex operation such as this. It’s like asking how you measure the success in raising your kids and shepherding your family. What do you measure?

Obedience of your children?

The number of times they say respectful words (”Thank you”, “Please”, “Sir/Ma’am”)?

Their grades?

Playing well with others?

Orderliness of their room?

The degree to which they look like their mother vs. their father? (Poor kids)

Do they pray daily and seek to know God personally?

Obviously, none of these “metrics” - in isolation - provides any sort of meaningful measure as to family quality. Making matters worse, any single day’s snap shot is likely to be full of glaring defects. Of course, maybe that’s just with MY family. . .

Similarly, I’m discomforted by the dramatically poor job that’s been done to measure Coalition success in Iraq (and by extrapolation) the greater Long War On Terrorism.

Below, I will attempt to layout an achievable, understandable and, yes, MEANINGFUL combination of metrics which really focuses on the three layers of effort in this Long War and the current Iraq/Afghan Surge:

1. Dramatically reduce the nation-state sponsorship of terrorism and the leadership centers of international terrorist networks

such that. . .

2. Local governments and cultures are able to police localized groups of terrorist

toward the end that. . .

3. Billions of individuals, free from heart-binding terror, are free to experience Life and Liberty and to Pursue virtuous happiness.

In light of these three levels of focus, it is helpful to remember the goal of the Iraq/Afghan Surge - to disrupt and eradicate terrorist control of population centers, especially Baghdad, to the end that the Iraqi government and people have the opportunity to self-police localized violence and build cultural support for contextualized Liberty.

So, what are these “Metrics” of success?

1. Combatants Eradicated
2. Accelerants to Violence Seized
3. Populations Freed
4. Hearts & Minds Won
5. Political Reconciliation & Institutions Built

I will summarize each of these here and then flesh each out in successive posts over the next week or so. No one of these Metric categories can completely encapsulate the degree of success or failure in our Iraq venture. Together, these metrics - and especially a trend line for the metrics over several months - can provide the substantive view of our progress for which so many of us are hungering.

1. Combatants Eradicated

There has been a thoughtful debate on the Hugh Hewitt show recently concerning the US Military’s disdain for releasing “body counts” of enemy killed due to unhealthy actions in Vietnam. At the same time, in battle, how else do you determine the scale of loss or victory without some sort of count?

I have a suggestion here. Victory on the battle field is not merely in terms of “kills”. It is measured by the number of combatants eradicated. When armies submit to terms of surrender (Appomattox, VE Day, VJ Day) combatants are eradicated (not killed) and the war or battle is won.

Suggestion:

Killed + Captured + Surrendered = Combatants Eradicated (Neutralized, Removed, whatever)

2. Accelerants to Violence Seized

In Iraq, most terrorists don’t work as mild mannered reporters by day and transform into the enacters of spectacular attacks at nights and on weekends.

Iraqi #1 - So, what did you do this weekend?

Iraqi #2 - Oh, the usual. I cleaned the house, spent time with the family, successful demobilized a US Army convoy with an EFP, pinned the surviving troops through covering fire and kidnapped 3 highly-trained American soldiers. You know, the usual.)

The energetic core of terrorism is a dynamo which must be fed by outside suppliers. These supplies are money, food, munitions, training, intelligence, false documents, mobilization capabilities, communications, etc.

Each of these “accelerants” seized, directly disarms or dis-empowers multiple combatant enemies, rendering them virtually eradicated.

Suggestion:

Bomb, bomb factories, booby traps, torture rooms, weapons caches, mobilization methods (boats, trucks, safe houses, etc) = Accelerants to Violence Seized

3. Populations Freed

The end goal of our military operations is to free population groups from the coagulation of terrorist overlords. Overlords, not street thugs. The context of the surge, again, is the Long War on Terrorism - especially Nation-state sponsored terrorism. Terrorists in a small country town are important, but terrorists in control of large industrial, population centers are more important.

Population centers allow for a more efficient ratio of terrorists to civilians for intimidation and control (the definition of terror). Population centers are also where one finds, takes control of and develops the accelerants to violence discussed above. Third, disrupting population centers is a more efficient means of amplifying ones effect through threatening disruption of infrastructure, the economy, regional tensions, etc.

Thus, ultimately, controlling population centers has to be a major goal of our enemy. Put another way: Terror groups don’t need nation-state funding, training and equipping to overwhelm and overpower al-Bubba in the middle of the desert. Nation-states, ultimately, are concerned about winning population centers and the means of industry they house.

Suggestion:

Parallel measures:

% of population under law & order (Coalition, then Local)

% of GDP within these areas

% of key industries within these areas (oil, electricity, food distribution)

4. Hearts & Minds Won

The guiding principle behind the American Revolution was that all governments derive their power from the consent of the governed . This is no different when the local rulers are tyrannical terrorists. In an earlier post, I quoted one of Gen. Petraeus’ chief advisors for Counterinsurgency:

“The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.”

Through the continued application of love (food distribution, healing the wounded, reconstruction, risk life to secure others, etc), our forces begin the process of warming hearts of a population driven into the cold darkness of terror. Eventually, individual by individual, a critical mass is reached where the population starts to enliven from being a host from which terrorist parasites are literally sucking life blood to an empowered populace with hope, capacity and fortitude to support the battle against their oppressors.

This turning of the tide is quite practical, dramatic and measurable. It occurs when former terrorists share the location of weapons caches, when residents identify rogues in their midst, when locals call in Coalition & Iraqi forces to confront marauders and take up arms to hold the encroaching darkness at bay until military support arrives.

Suggestion:

# of local leaders pleading to work with the coalition + level of support from locals in identifying terrorists + level of support from locals in identifying the accelerants of violence = Hearts and Minds won from darkness to light.

5. Political Reconciliation & Institutions Built

Media coverage follows either the path of least resistance or fights bravely to secure the lowlands of scandal. Asymmetrical violence, punctuated with spectacular (derived from “spectacle”) one-off attacks on civilians, sequesters all media attention by conditioned stimulus / response reactions . Governmental benchmarks on the national level are easy to cover in 30 second sound bits.

Reconciliation between little known sheiks with hard to pronounce names, the rise of police recruiting in an unknown Baghdad suburb and the development of a local food warehouse do little to stir the attention of a restless America torn between reruns of Seinfeld and coverage of Iraq.

If you were an Iraqi, especially one with family, which of the following would most likely captivate your attention and impact your daily life:

1. A power-sharing agreement in Baghdad between Sunni ex-Saddam regime supports and Shiite ex-patriots recently returned to Iraq - - OR - - Historic cooperation between Sunni and Shiite leaders in your neighborhood, city or Province/State?

2. An agreement to share oil revenues from a distribution system which still needs a couple years of repairs before being fully operations - - OR - - the construction of a food distribution center and efforts to secure the convoy routes by which life giving staples are delivered to your desert region in the midst of the 120 degree summer?

Government takes two forms. The national bureaucracy which is critical to building lasting institutions, negotiating international trade, providing national security, distributing treasury funds, etc. And the local leadership which polices streets, renders justice, applies distributed funds to felt community needs, etc.

For too long, America and the world focused on and forced the development of the national form with the hope that the local form would soon follow - despite the personalized terror of death squads. A little heralded part of the Surge strategy, worked in concert with Ambassador Crocker is to continue to push for national progress, but to foster and support the quicker wins of local reconciliation and reconstruction. There is a new national election in 2009 to elect new representatives to the national government. If more provinces have successfully developed vibrant local capabilities, perhaps better representatives can be found to build a more stable, more broadly representative national government.

Suggestion:

Examples of local reconciliation efforts + completed, local reconstruction projects + local institutions (courts, police, food distribution, etc) developed.

On Principle,
CBass

While the world debates the status of Iraq in the Long War on Terrorism, we shouldn’t forget that there is another front in this battle. The original front. The front on which most of the “international community” originally bestowed its stamp of approval - before loosing interest and withholding funds promised for defense and reconstruction.

(Ok, not all nations have fallen short on their promises, but it is easy to say that support has not been as full throated as we may have desired.)

From this original front, now relegated to being the “other” front comes the following news. Looks like this less-looked-over surge is producing promising gains.

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Afghan and ISAF forces clearly have good intelligence on the movement and locations of several senior Taliban leaders, including two members of the Taliban’s Shura Majlis, or executive council. Mohammad’s death follows the death or captured of several senior Taliban leaders since December 2006. Numerous regional and district-level Taliban commanders have been killed or captured during the same time period.

• U.S. forces killed Mullah Akhtar Usmani, a member of the Taliban Shura Majlis, or executive council in December 2006. Mullah Omar’s former deputy, a former foreign minister, and the operational commander in Uruzgan, Nimroz, Kandahar, Farah, Herat and Helmand provinces in southern Afghanistan.

• Afghan forces captured Taliban spokesman Dr. Muhammad Hanifon January 16, 2007. Hanif has given numerous interviews with the media, and issued press releases and rebuttals to NATO and Afghan statements. He was said to have been in instant satellite phone and email contact with the press. Hanif claimed that Mullah Omar is operating out of Quetta.

• In late February, Pakistani security forces arrested Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban Defense Minister during the reign of the Taliban from 1996 until the United States toppled the government in the fall of 2001. Obaidullah “is considered by American intelligence officials to have been one of the Taliban leaders closest to Osama bin Laden, ” as well as part of the “inner core of the Taliban leadership around the Mullah Muhammad Omar who are believed to operate from the relative safety of Quetta.” Obaidullah was a member of the Shura Majlis, and was thought to be the Taliban’s third in command.

• The Afghan military confirmed Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the brutal, charismatic, and respected Taliban military commander and leader of the forces in southern Afghanistan, was killed during an air strike on May 13. Mullah Dadullah sat on the Taliban Shura Majlis He was the Taliban’s most senior military commander and reported to have been one of Mullah Omar’s most trusted advisers. Dadullah joined forces with the Taliban at its formation in 1994. After the fall of Afghanistan in 2001, Dadullah fled to South Waziristan in Pakistan, where he reconstituted his forces and continued to fight NATO and Afghan forces. Dadullah orchestrated and promoted the Taliban’s suicide campaign in Afghanistan.

• On June 12, ISAF forces killed Mullah Mahmud Baluch, a senior Taliban commander in the Helmand and Nimruz provinces.

Just a reminder that there is another nation in which US troops, together with a coalition of nations, are engaging in working with a brave people to secure liberty of conscience from a deadly international band of thugs, murders and tyrants.

On Principle,
CBass

“Once again our national team has shown that there is only one, united Iraq.”

In yesterday’s post, I summarized some of the metrics from the newly initiated “Operational Surge”. In this post, David Kilcullen, Gen. Petraeus’ Australian Chief Advisor for Counterinsurgency, provides a summary of the theory/thinking behind the “Surge” which should be proclaimed from every media outlet in the country. It deserves to be studied and dissected.

No one can read this explanation without realizing that the word “Surge” is entirely insufficient to define this strategy’s complete separation from strategies of the past.

Here are a few key excerpts:

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“When we speak of “clearing” an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation.”

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“The “terrain” we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on.”

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“The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.”

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“But chasing enemy cells around the countryside is not only a waste of time, it is precisely the sort of action he wants to provoke us into. That’s why AQ cells leaving an area are not the main game—they are a distraction. We played the enemy’s game for too long: not any more. Now it is time for him to play our game.”

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“The enemy may not be identifiable, but the population is. In any given area in Iraq, there are multiple threat groups but only one, or sometimes two main local population groups.”

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“casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the “defensive crouch” with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off.”

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“It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing.”

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I’m so glad to have this Aussie standing with our troops!

On Principle,

CBass